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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIES AFTER International Paper Co. v. Ouellette
For the last two decades, courts have been grappling with the
application of common law nuisance doctrines to-interstate pollution
disputes. The area has become particularly complex as both federal and
state regulatory programs have evolved. Generally, regulatory programs
do not provide relief for injured individuals, and plaintiffs often resort
to the common law for a compensatory remedy. In interstate disputes,
a basic issue is which jurisdiction's common law of nuisance applies.
Both federal and state law possibilities exist. On the state level, one
could apply the law of the state affected by the migration of pollutants
(affected state), or the law of the state from which the pollution emanated
(source state). A third possibility is the application of a federal common
law. Finally, one could also find that the federal regulatory program
has preempted all common law remedies and the victim therefore should
be left uncompensated. The United States Supreme Court recently ad-
dressed this problem in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette.'
The International Paper Co. (IPC) is located in the state of New
York. It discharges a variety of effluents into Lake Champlain pursuant
to a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency. The point at
which effluents enter the lake is a short distance from the Vermont
border. In 1978, a group of Vermont landowners and lessees filed a
class action suit claiming that the discharges constituted a continuing
nuisance 2 under Vermont common law. Specifically, they alleged that
the pollutants made the water unhealthy and "smelly," thereby dimin-
ishing the value of their property. They sought over $100 million in
compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief, which
would have forced IPC to restructure its water treatment system. IPC
moved for summary judgement, claiming that the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 19723 (Clean Water Act) preempted
Copyright 1988, by LOuiSiANA LAW REViEW.
1. 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
2. Generally, a private nuisance has come to be defined as unreasonable interference,
whether intentional, reckless, negligent, or otherwise, with another's use and enjoyment
of his land. See Abdella v. Smith, 34 Wis. 2d 393, 149 N.W.2d 537 (1967); Claude v.
Weaver Constr. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968); Nicholson v. Connecticut
Half-Way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966); Sans v. Ramsey Golf and
Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438, 149 A.2d 599 (1959); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.,
28 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821-822
(1977).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982).
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any suit based on state law. The United States Supreme Court held that
the Clean Water Act preempts the common law of the affected state
to the extent that it would impose liability on a source of pollution
located in another state. However, the court allowed victims of such
pollution living in the affected state to sue under the law of the source
state for relief. 4
This article examines the rationale of International Paper and at-
tempts to extend its interpretation of the Clean Water Act to both air
and hazardous waste statutes. It concludes that after International Paper,
only the common law of the source state should apply to interstate
pollution disputes governed by the Clean Air Act,' which deals with air
pollution regulation, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 6
(RCRA), which deals with hazardous waste regulation. However, no
such limitation should apply when the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 7 (CERCLA) (dealing with
hazardous waste clean-up) alone governs the dispute. In such situations,
the law of either state could apply under normal choice of law rules.
When both RCRA and CERCLA apply, RCRA should control the
preemption question, thereby preempting the affected state's law.
I. WATER POLLUTION REGULATION
The goal of the Clean Water Act was to eliminate the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.8 While elimination of pollutants
remains a goal, the 1972 Amendments allow discharges to continue
under a technology-based permit system called the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System 9 (NPDES). This system prohibits the dis-
charge of effluents unless the "point source"' 1 has obtained a permit
4. 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987). This issue is not without importance. Nuisance is determined
by a standard of reasonableness, and this standard varies from state to state according
to each state's environmental regulations and philosophy. Also, the effect each state gives
to compliance with a permit may differ. For example, some states hold that a permit,
by itself, is not intended to provide immunity from damage caused by the activity, so
that nuisance claims are still viable. See Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Massengill, 255 Ga.
360, 338 S.E.2d 428 (1986). Other states hold that an act expressly authorized cannot be
a nuisance, since all interests are considered when making such authorizations. See Borough
of Collegeville v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 377 Pa. 636, 105 A.2d 722 (1954).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
6. Id. at §§ 6901-91 (1982).
7. Id. at §§ 9601-75 (1982).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
9. Id. at § 1342.
10. Id. at § 1362(14). "Point source" is defined as "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." In the
context of this area of the law, "point source" also refers to the party discharging
effluents.
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from the EPA." The permit must meet technological requirements prom-
ulgated under the Act, and the EPA Administrator may impose con-
ditions on the permit to assure compliance such as data collection and
reporting requirements.' 2 A source state is allowed to impose more
stringent standards, and even take over the permit authority as long as
it has adopted the minimum EPA standards. 3 An affected state has
only the right to notice of the proposed discharge in the source state,
and the right to object and receive written reasons for the disallowance
of those objections. 4 If the EPA Administrator determines that a state
permit is outside of the guidelines of the Act, it may veto the state
permit and issue its own. 5
The sections of the Clean Water Act with the greatest potential
impact on the preemption question in International Paper were the citizen
suit provision' 6 and the state law retention provision. 7 The citizen suit
provision was designed primarily to clear up standing and amount in
controversy problems with class action suits under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 23.18 Instead of bringing a class action suit, the citizen
suit provision allows an individual or group of individuals to sue on
their own behalf to enforce a state or EPA permit. It also allows such
individuals to compel the administrator to perform nondiscretionary
duties under the Act.
The citizen suit section however, does not provide an action for
individual personal or property damages. Instead, it includes a saving
clause, which states:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against
the Administrator or State agency).' 9
The legislative history of this provision somewhat clarifies its meaning:
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve
any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be
shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with re-
11. Id. at § 1311.
12. Id. at § 1342(a)(1)-(2).
13. Id. at § 1342(b), 1370.
14. Id. at § 1342(b)(5).
15. Id. at § 1342(d).
16. Id. at § 1365.
17. Id. at § 1370.
18. Rule 23 provides that a member of a class may sue as a representative of that
class.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
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quirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law
action for pollution damages.''20
In another section, the state law retention provision, the Act further
defines the role the states are to play under this regulatory scheme by
specifically preserving state authority over waters within the state. The
state law retention provision reads:
Except as expressly provided ... , nothing in this chapter
shall .. .be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting
any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States.21
The legislative history to this section indicates that Congress intended
to allow the states to adopt and enforce effluent standards or any other
requirement respecting control or abatement of water pollution more
stringent than those established by the EPA.22
The case law in this area reflects the substantive changes of the
1972 Amendments. Before the enactment of the amendments, the Su-
preme Court decided Illinois v. City of Milwaukee" (Milwaukee 1).
Illinois claimed that local governments in Wisconsin were dumping raw
sewerage into Lake Michigan and asked the Supreme Court to invoke
its original jurisdiction over the dispute. The Court refused to exercise
original jurisdiction,, but held that the federal district court had the
jurisdiction to hear the case under the federal common law of nuisance.2 4
One of the major concerns in this case was that Illinois would not have
a forum to protect its interests under the pre-1972 Act. 2 Therefore, a
federal common law was created, also providing a forum in the federal
district courts. The Supreme Court went even further in establishing
federal control over these disputes, stating: "[t]he [pre-amended] Act
makes clear that it is federal, not state, law that in the end controls
the pollution of interstate or navigable waters. "26
'Later that year Congress passed the Clean Water Act Amendments
of 1972.27 The amendments added the NPDES permit system and con-
20. 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3746.
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
22. Supra note 20, at 3749.
23. 406 U.S. 91, 92 S. Ct. 1385 (1972).
24. Id. at 93, 92 S. Ct. at 1388.
25. Id. at 104, 107, 92 S. Ct. at 1393, 1395. At that time, there were no requirements
that the affected state receive notice or a hearing under § 1342.
26. Id. at 102, 92 S. Ct. at 1392.
27. Although the term "Clean Water Act" was not used in the 1972 amendments,
the 1977 amendments refer to the 1972 amendments as such. The term is also generically
used to refer to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in its current form. "Clean
Water Act," as used in this paper, will refer to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and all amendments to date.
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tained section 402, which, among other things, provided the affected
state with the right to participate in the permit process. It also contained
the citizen suit and its saving clause, as well as the state law retention
provision. The effect this had on the Court's broad assertion of federal
dominance in Milwaukee I remained unclear.
Illinois refused to participate in the subsequent Wisconsin permit
proceeding as provided by the Clean Water Act. Instead the state pressed
its claims in the district court under the federal common law of nuisance,
pursuant to the holding in Milwaukee I. However, in City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois"8 (Milwaukee 11), the Supreme Court held that the 1972
Amendments had preempted the federal common law of nuisance. The
Court reasoned that the statute created a comprehensive program of
water pollution regulation. The problem that concerned the Court in
Milwaukee I, that Illinois would be denied a forum, was no longer a
concern, since Illinois could have protected its interests by participating
in the permit process, but chose not to. 29
As far as the saving clause in the citizen suit section was concerned,
the Supreme Court held that although it prevented preemption based
on that "section," it did not prevent the Act as a whole from preempting
federal common law remedies. 30 The decision stated that the state law
retention clause was not relevant to the issue of whether the federal
common law could be used to impose conditions more stringent than
that of the permit.31
Later that same year, the Supreme Court extended this reasoning
to all federal implied rights of action. In Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Claimers Association,32 the Supreme Court
cited Milwaukee II and held more specifically that the only private rights
of action included in the Clean Water Act were the citizen suits au-
thorized by the Act, because all other actions under the federal common
law were preempted. Citizen suits allow a plaintiff to demand enforce-
ment of an NPDES permit, but they do not provide for damages or
the power to enforce the standards of the affected state. Moreover,
Milwaukee II now made it clear that the federal common law was
unavailable.
Illinois apparently recognized the possibility that the 1972 amend-
ments resurrected the application of state common law to interstate
water pollution disputes. Despite the sweeping preemption language of
Milwaukee J,33 the state pressed its claim on Illinois common law, rather
28. 451 U.S. 304, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
29. Id. at 326-27, 101 S. Ct. at 1797-98.
30. Id. at 328-29, 101 S. Ct. at 1798-99.
31. Id. at 328, 101 S. Ct. at 1798.
32. 453 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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than the federal common law remedy that the Milwaukee II Court had
rejected. It claimed that the law of the affected state was not preempted
under the Clean Water Act. In fact, it argued, the state law retention
provision 34 specifically preserved state law rights of action.
The Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee lIP rejected these claims and,
citing Milwaukee I, held that all state common law remedies in interstate
water pollution disputes were preempted. Specifically, it applied the
reasoning of Milwaukee II that the citizen suit saving clause applied
only to the section on citizen suits and not to the entirety of the Act.
3 6
Then the court held that the state law retention clause applied only to
activity occurring within the state's borders, and not to interstate pol-
lution disputes.17
The following year, the Vermont federal district court ruled on the
International Paper case.38 This court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit
and held that Congress did not intend to prevent the affected state from
applying its law to interstate disputes. It reasoned that since decreasing
the level of water pollution was the stated purpose of the Clean Water
Act, compensatory awards could only further that goal. Therefore, the
application of the affected state's common law was not in conflict with
the Act.39
The Second Circuit affirmed, adopting the district court's reasons.4
This presented a split in the circuits to the Supreme Court over whether
the state common law remedies applied to interstate water pollution
disputes. The Seventh Circuit had held that all state common law rem-
edies were preempted by the Clean Water Act, while the Second Circuit
held that none were.
In essence, the Supreme Court's position in International Paper is
a compromise between the two circuits' positions. Writing for a five
member majority, 4' Justice Powell concluded that the Clean Water Act
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 414.
37. Id. at 413.
38. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985).
39. Id. at 269-71.
40. 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in the holding that
only the source state's nuisance law could be applied. Furthermore, Justice Stevens, whom
Justice Blackmun joined, wrote that the Court's opinion should be considered advisory
because the issue of what state's law should apply had not yet arisen in the litigation;
the only issue before the court was whether the district court could entertain a common
law nuisance suit against a point source in one state based on an injury suffered in
another. According to all of the dissenters, the Court did not yet know whether the
district court would have been required, under conflict of law rules, to apply the nuisance
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preempted the common law of the affected state to the extent that it
would impose liability on a point source located in another state. 42 He
reasoned that the Act is "pervasive" in its regulatory scheme, encom-
passing all' point sources and most bodies of water. 43 The Act also
provides some remedies for violations, such as civil and criminal fines
for permit violations," and the citizen suit provision. 45 Justice Powell
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the state law retention clause applied
only to intrastate water pollution activity and not to activity occurring
outside of the state. 46 He reiterated the holding in Milwaukee II that
the saving clause in the citizen suit section did not prevent the Act in
its entirety from preempting other laws. The Court then held that this
preemption included the law of the affected state.
47
Justice Powell determined that the intent to preempt may be pre-
sumed when the legislation "leaves no room" for state regulation. 48 A
state law is also preempted if it interferes with the methods by which
the federal goals are to be attained. 49 In issuing a permit, he reasoned,
the EPA Administrator or the source state's permit authority balances
the goal of the Clean Water Act to eliminate water pollution against
the costs incurred to accomplish it. Allowing an affected state to impose
liability on a point source because it violated that state's more stringent
standards would disrupt this balance of policy choices.5 0 Since this
method of accomplishing the federal purpose would be interfered with
by the imposition of liability under the affected state's law, the Act
preempted that law.
As interpreted by the majority, this rationale does not apply to the
imposition of common law liability under the source state's law. The
state law retention provision, since it applies to activities occurring within
the source state's borders, authorizes that state to impose regulations
law of New York anyway. Therefore, the decision was premature.
Given the recent resignation of Justice Powell, the future strength of the holding in
International Paper could be called into question. If the dissenting justices consider the
opinion "advisory," it is possible that they will not give the decision the deference normally
accorded to prior Supreme Court opinions. Under this scenario, the position of the newest
member, Justice Kennedy, will become important.
42. 107 S. Ct. at 816.
43. Id. at 812.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
45. 107 S. Ct. at 812.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 812-13.
48. Id. at 811 (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct.
1146, 1152 (1947)).
49. Id. at 813 (citing Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mkt. and
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 477, 104 S. Ct. 2518, 2527 (1984)).
50. Id.
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or liability more stringent than that of the Clean Water Act.5" Therefore,
the only compensatory remedies available to 'private individuals for dam-
ages resulting from the discharge of water pollution must be found
under the source state's law.
For the most part, a plaintiff's choice of forum is not upset by
this rationale. He may sue in the courts of the affected state, or he
may sue in the courts of the source state.52 Since it is likely that there
will often be diversity, the plaintiff may also sue in federal court.
Whatever forum is chosen, however, must apply the substantive law of
the source state to the dispute.
The remaining question to be faced is the extent to which this
interpretation can be extended to other areas of environmental regulation,
in particular the Clean Air Act, RCRA, and CERCLA.
II. AIR POLLUTION
Noting the close relationship between the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act, Professor Rogers stated that "[c]ross-citation in air and
water cases 'is legion, so much so that the two regions in many ways
can be viewed as a single body of evolving law.' "" Yet there are
differences between the statutes that make it impossible to infer pre-
emption from the Clean Air Act simply because the Court has done so
in the Clean Water Act. If such a- preemption is found to exist in the
Clean Air Act, it must be found on its own terms.5 4
The primary purpose of the Clean Air Act is to protect the nation's
air quality "so as to promote the public health and welfare." 5 To do
this, the Administrator of the EPA is required to establish national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for any pollutants that may
endanger the public's health or welfare.56 Each state must submit an
implementation plan (SIP), which regulates stationary sources by pro-
viding for "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance
51. Id. at 814-15.
52. Under well settled principles of jurisdiction, a Vermont state court could hear
the dispute, assuming it could get jurisdiction over the defendant. However, the substantive
law to govern the dispute would be determined by choice of law rules.
The Court's holding in International Paper is a compromise between the Second and
Seventh Circuits' positions in two respects. First, it allows the states, including the affected
state, to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. Secondly, it allows state common law
remedies to supply compensation to victims of pollution, but only under the law of the
source state. While a plaintiff in interstate disputes may not avail himself of the substantive
law of his state, at least he is not required to travel to a distant and inconvenient forum.
53. 1 W. Rogers, Environmental Law-Air and Water § 3.1(A)(2) (1986).
54. United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. N.J. 1982).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
56. Id. at § 7409.
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with such limitations. 5 7 These limitations, taken cumulatively, must be
sufficient to attain the ambient standards. The plan must also assure
that state agencies will have the proper resources and authority to enforce
the plan."' The Administrator must approve the state plan if it meets
the Act's minimum requirements. 9 If the plan is disapproved and the
state does not correct the deficiencies, the EPA must amend the plan
to do so.60 Once the plan is approved, it becomes enforceable as federal
as well as state law. 61
As far as interstate migration of air pollution is concerned, the plan
cannot allow pollutants to be emitted that will prevent the attainment
of the ambient standards in another state. 62 Furthermore, a procedure
is established that allows a state or political subdivision to petition the
EPA to determine whether an out-of-state source has released or is
threatening to release an air pollutant in excess of the NAAQS. 61
In one important respect the Clean Air Act is not as pervasive as
the Clean Water Act. Unlike the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act
does not regulate all stationary sources of pollution. Instead, it designates
certain air pollutants considered dangerous to the public health. The
Act also provides for the establishment of national standards (the NAAQS)
for those pollutants, which states are required to implement by regulating
stationary sources. Pollutants for which no ambient air standards are
applicable, but whose emissions are nevertheless anticipated to result in
an increase in mortality or serious illness, may be deemed "hazardous"
by the Administrator. These pollutants are subject to regulation by the
NESHAP's-National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants. 64 Other stationary sources emitting pollutants for which NAAQS
or NESHAPs have not been established remain unregulated. 65
The Act contains a state law retention clause somewhat different in
wording from the Clean Water Act's state law saving provision:
Except as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this Act shall
preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision
thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation re-
specting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement re-
specting control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an
57. Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(B).
58. Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(F).
59. Id. at § 7410(a)(2).
60. Id. at § 7410(c)(1).
61. Id. at § 7413(a).
62. Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(E).
63. Id. at § 7426(b).
64. Id. at § 7412.
65. K. Murchison, Interstate Pollution: The Need for Federal Common Law, 6 Va.
J. Nat. Res. 1, 25 (1986).
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emission standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable
implementation plan or section 111 or 112, such State or political
subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or
limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section."
Notably missing from this provision is the qualifying clause found in
the Clean Water Act: "with respect to the waters (including boundary
waters) of such States." ' 67 This language, as interpreted in International
Paper, allows the state to impose more stringent requirements only as
to activity occurring within that state. There is no such limitation ex-
pressed by the above Clean Air Act language.
The Second Circuit, however, in Connecticut v. E.P.A.,68 may have
indicated how this section will be interpreted. The states of Connecticut
and New Jersey objected to the EPA approval of a revision of a New
York State Implementation Plan because the EPA failed to consider
their state's more stringent requirements. The circuit court refused to
overrule the EPA action because it found that the approval must only
consider whether the plan meets the minimum Clean Air Act require-
ments, not the neighboring state's requirements. 69 While this case did
not involve an attempt to impose common law liability on a source of
air pollution in another state, it did include strong language implying
the same interpretation of the Clean Air Act provisions as its counterpart
in the Clean Water Act:
Nothing in the Act, however, indicates that a state must
respect its neighbor's air quality standards (or design its SIP to
avoid interference therewith) if those standards are more stringent
than the requirements of federal law. 70
Of course; this case involved the administrative approval of a State
Implementation Plan, not common law liability. Thus, it could easily
be distinguished by a court willing to impose liability on an out-of-state
source of air pollution.
If the section can be interpreted as, at a minimum, being indifferent
as to the applicability of one state's nuisance law on an out-of-state
source, then the focus shifts to other sections of the Act to see if
preemption can nevertheless be implied. The Clean Air Act contains a
citizen suit provision and saving clause virtually identical to that of the
Clean Water Act. In contrast to the state law retention clause, the Clean
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 909.
70. Id.
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Air Act's version of the citizen suit saving clause is exactly the same
as its Clean Water Act counterpart.7' Therefore, the saving clause is
clearly susceptible to the same interpretation given to the Clean Water
Act's provision in International Paper. The phrase "[niothing in this
section" qualifies the saving clause so that the entirety of the Act could
preempt state law, even though nothing in the citizen suit section alone
could do so.
This is precisely the position taken in United States v. Kin-Buc7 2
and Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc.7 Both of these cases held that after
Milwaukee 11 and National Sea Claimers, the Clean Air Act preempted
federal common law. While no cases have applied this rationale to the
applicability of the saving clause to the affected state's common law,
such a holding could reasonably be expected.
With the citizen suit saving clause probably receiving the same
treatment as its counterpart in the Clean Water Act, and the state law
retention clause at best ambiguous on the use of an affected state's
common law to impose liability on an out-of-state source, the preemption
question ultimately will be decided by the structure and purpose of the
Clean Air Act. Historically, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act have developed as sister statutes. For example, the Clean Air Act's
ambient air quality standards were modeled after the Clean Water Act's
water quality standards, which gave way to effluent limitations in the
1972 amendments. 74 This "cross-fertilization" 75 has resulted in a very
similar statutory scheme. In both Acts, minimum federal standards are
created that states are required to implement. Federal control is main-
tained through EPA enforcement mechanisms. Both Acts allow a state
to enforce more stringent standards and to participate in the approval
of other state's plans or permits. Both Acts give individuals standing
through citizen suits to enforce state or federal standards. Moreover, it
could be argued that the imposition of one state's liability law on an
out-of-state source would interfere with the policy choices made in the
other state's implementation plan, which was a primary concern of the
Court in International Paper. In short, the statutes are sufficiently similar
to extend the interpretation of the Clean Water Act in International
Paper to the Clean Air Act.
However, as mentioned above, some pollutants are not regulated by
the Clean Air Act. One of these pollutants is acid rain, which is formed
in the atmosphere as a result of the combination of sulfur dioxide and
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e).
72. 532 F. Supp. 699, 703 (D. N.J. 1982).
73. 593 F. Supp. 360, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
74. W. Rogers, supra note 53.
75. Id.
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oxides of nitrogen, two forms of pollutants regulated by the EPA. Since
acid "deposition" is not covered by the Act's interstate pollution pro-
visions, the Clean Air Act does not regulate it.76
The reasoning that preempts the affected state's law is inapplicable
to pollutants that are unregulated by the Clean Air Act. The regulatory
scheme is undisturbed by the imposition of common law liability for
releases of unregulated pollutants. Only in the situation where the pol-
lutants in question are regulated by the Clean Air Act is the law of
the affected state preempted.
III. HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION
Two federal statutes deal with the regulation and clean-up of haz-
ardous waste pollution. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) is primarily prospective in nature and controls the disposal of
hazardous wastes into regulated facilities. The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensatory and Liability Act (CERCLA) is pri-
marily a remedial statute, establishing liability for the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites.
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RCRA was enacted primarily to deal with the growing problem of
unsafe hazardous waste disposal sites.7 7 Like the Clean Water Act and
the Clean Air Act, it is generally prospective in nature, establishing
fairly extensive regulations for those in the business of handling haz-
ardous wastes. It does not provide private causes of action for damages
7 8
although section 7003(a) has been construed as providing for recovery
by the government of its "response" costs. 79 In short, although designed
specifically to deal with hazardous waste disposal operations, RCRA is
similar in many ways to the Clean Water Act.
RCRA initially provides that the EPA Administrator shall establish
criteria for identifying hazardous waste, "taking into account toxicity,
persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in
tissue, and other related factors . ... "0 It then establishes specific
standards of conduct for generators,"' transporters,8 2 and owners-oper-
76. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134
U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 170 (1985).
77. 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 6239-41.
78. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
79. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a). See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of
"response" costs.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a).
81. Id. at § 6922.
82. Id. at § 6923.
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ators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.8"
Like the Clean Water Act, the primary enforcement mechanism is a
permit system,8' and the RCRA prohibits any treatment, storage, or
disposal of hazardous waste without such a permit. 5 In addition, the
EPA is given inspection powers86 and may issue compliance orders or
request judicial enforcement of the Act.8 7 Also, like the Clean Water
Act, the states are allowed to adopt their own hazardous waste regulatory
program, subject to EPA approval, which is to operate "in lieu of the
Federal program." 88
The Act also contains a state law retention clause:
No State or political subdivision may impose any require-
ments less stringent than those authorized under this subchapter
respecting the same matter as governed by such regulations ....
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State
or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements,
including those for site selection, which are more stringent than
those imposed by such regulations .... 89
Like its counterpart in the Clean Air Act, and unlike its counterpart
in the Clean Water Act, this provision contains no language that would
indicate an intent to limit this authority to intrastate activity, nor any
language indicating an intent that it should apply to interstate activity.
It is silent on whether a state may use its common law under RCRA
to impose liability on an out-of-state source of pollution. If a prohibition
of such authority under International Paper is to be read into RCRA,
it must come from other sections of the Act.
RCRA contains a citizen suit provision that is very similar to the
Clean Water Act's provision. 9° More importantly, its saving clause is
virtually identical to that of the Clean Water Act:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement
relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous waste,
or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Admin-
istrator or a State agency). 9
83. Id. at § 6924.
84. Id. at § 6925.
85. Id. at § 6925(a).
86. Id. at § 6927.
87. Id. at § 6928.
88. Id. at § 6926(b).
89. Id. at § 6929. See People v. Roth, 129 Misc. 2d 381, 492 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Suffolk
Co. Ct. 1985) (States may impose more, but not less, stringent standards.).
90. Id. at § 6972.
91. Id. at § 6972(f).
19881
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The marked similarity of this provision to the Clean Water Act suggests
the same interpretation as in International Paper. Therefore, this pro-
vision should prevent only preemption based on that section, but should
have no effect on the ability of the Act as a whole to preempt state
law to the extent that it conflicts with the regulatory scheme.
RCRA has been interpreted as preserving common law nuisance
actions in interstate disputes under it.92 In Allied Towing v. Great Eastern
Petroleum Corp.,9 the defendant, Publicker, faced with negligence and
strict liability claims, contended that the legislative framework surround-
ing RCRA and CERCLA preempted state causes of action for damages.
Publicker based this argument primarily on Milwaukee II and National
Sea Claimers, which dealt with the Clean Water Act. The district court
disagreed, holding that the saving clauses in both statutes reflect an
intent to preserve common law damage actions in addition to RCRA
and CERCLA.94 The court ignored Milwaukee Is suggestion that the
citizen suit saving clause applied only to that section and not to the
entirety of the Act. It also refused to follow the Seventh Circuit's holding
in Milwaukee III that all state common law actions were preempted.
Instead, it cited the Second Circuit's decision in International Paper and
provisions of RCRA's legislative history and held that the Act itself
contemplated preserving all state common law rights of action. 95
It should be noted that Allied Towing was decided after the Supreme
Court had granted writs in International Paper, but before a decision
was rendered. If International Paper's interpretation of the citizen suit
saving clause is applied, then the effect of the provisions of RCRA and
the legislative history cited by the district court in Allied Towing become
limited to the citizen suit section only. Therefore, a more comprehensive
view of the Act must be taken to resolve the preemption question.
RCRA is similar to the Clean Water Act both in structure and
purpose. It allows the states to play a key role in implementation of
the regulatory scheme. But most importantly, it contains a permit system
like that of the Clean Water Act as the key enforcement mechanism.
The International Paper Court ruled that the affected state's law was
92. Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 1985); State
v. Schenectady Chemicals, 103 A.D.2d 33, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984); State v. Monarch
Chemicals, 90 A.D.2d 907, 456 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1982).
93. 642 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1986).
94. Id. at 1350-51.
95. Id. at 1351. "Although [we have] not prohibited a citizen from raising claims
under state law in a [section 6972 RCRAI action, [we] expect courts to exercise their
discretion concerning pendant jurisdiction .... " H.R. Rep. No. 98-198, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 53; reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5576, 5612. See also 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 54, reprinted at 5608. "[section 6972] of RCRA
was intended to preserve the rights of litigants under any statute of [sic] common law,
notwithstanding the passage of RCRA."
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preempted because the imposition of liability under that state's law on
an out-of-state source would interfere with the policy choices made in
the permit process, 96 and the same concerns should be applicable here.
It follows that RCRA should be interpreted, in light of International
Paper, as preempting the affected state's law in interstate pollution
disputes. But the common law of the source state should be retained,
pursuant to the state law retention clause and the need for viability of
the permit system.
B. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
Extending the rationale of International Paper to CERCLA is more
problematic. Unlike the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, or RCRA,
CERCLA is a remedial rather than a regulatory statute. 97 It was enacted
hurriedly in 1980 to deal with sites, such as the Love Canal, that were
so dangerous that immediate clean-up action was required. CERCLA
was passed as a compromise between three competing bills-House Re-
ports 85 and 7020, and Senate Report 1480.98 The result is that "CER-
CLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions
and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history." 99
Despite this vagueness, two primary purposes of CERCLA are ev-
ident. First, the federal government is given the means to respond
immediately and effectively to imminent dangers resulting from hazard-
ous waste disposal. Second, the costs and responsibility for responding
to these harmful conditions are to be borne by those responsible for
causing the harmful conditions."0
CERCLA specifically provides that whenever there is a release or
threatened release of any hazardous substance or pollutant presenting
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health, the President
may arrange for the removal of the dangerous substances and take any
remedial action consistent with a national contingency plan. 0 1 Ordinarily
the state in which the release occurs must first enter into a cooperation
agreement with the federal government assuring all future maintenance
and response actions. 02 The states are also required to provide at least
96. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
97. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir.
1986).
98. Dedham, 805 F.2d 1074 (lst Cir. 1986).
99. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985).
100. United States v. Reilly Tar and Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
102. Id. at § 9604(c)(3).
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ten percent of the funding for these response actions.103 This often causes
problems as some states have not provided such funding. If state funding
is not provided, the President is authorized to respond to emergency
situations without it.1° Generally, however, a state is authorized to carry
out any response action provided for in the Act if the President de-
termines the state is capable. 05
CERCLA then provides for the liability of responsible persons for
response costs. Current owners and operators of the vessel or facility,
any owner or operator at the time of disposal, any person who by
agreement arranged for transportation for disposal or treatment of haz-
ardous substances, and any person who accepted such substances for
transport are liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the governmental authority.' °6 These parties are also liable for any
other cost of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan, 0 7 damages to the United States for destruction
of national resources, and the cost of a health effects study.10s
In summary, these parties are liable for all "response" costs incurred.
"Response" is defined as a generic term including both the removal
and remedial action.' 9 "Removal" includes the cleanup action, preven-
tion of a threatened release, and all costs incident thereto." 0 "Remedial"
includes those actions in addition to the removal actions to prevent
migration, such as dredging, excavating, or diverting. It also includes
the costs of permanent relocation of residents when the President de-
termines this is preferable or necessary, and the costs of offsite trans-
portation and storage of the hazardous substances."'
Finally CERCLA established the "Hazardous Substance Response
Trust Fund,""11 2 commonly known as the "superfund." This fund is to
be used to pay the costs of the government's response until reimburse-
ment can be obtained from those responsible.
103. Id.
104. Id. at § 9604(a)(4).
105. Id. at § 9604(d)(1).
106. Although the distinction is not important for the preemption question, it may
be helpful to explain more fully the operation of CERCLA. As far as the cleanup authority
is concerned, the EPA may order private parties to clean up a site, or it may do so
itself. In addition, private parties may conduct a cleanup consistent with the National
Contingency Plan. As far as liability is concerned, the EPA may recover from responsible
parties the response costs it incurred. If the cleanup was conducted by a private party,
that party may also recover response costs from responsible parties to the extent that
such costs were incurred consistently with the National Contingency Plan.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
108. Id.
109. Id. at § 9601(25).
110. Id. at § 9601(23).
111. Id. at § 9601(24).
112. Id. at § 9631.
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The Act contains a number of saving provisions relevant to this
inquiry. The first is found in section 114(a) dealing with the relationship
of the Act to other laws: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed or
interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability
or. requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances
within such State.""' 3 Unlike the saving clause found in other environ-
mental statutes, this one clearly applies to the entire Act. However, like
the state law retention cl4use found in the Clean Water Act, it is easily
subject to the limitation that it saves only intrastate authority. Under
this section, therefore, the law of the affected state could still be pre-
empted even though the law of the, source state has been retained.
The section providing for the effective date of the Act also contains
a saving provision: "Nothing in this Chapter shall affect or modify in
any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal
or State law, including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous
substances or other pollutants or contaminants 
. . . .4 'This section
could be interpreted as saving the affected state's law. It specifically
states that nothing in the entirety of the Act shall affect the liability
of a person under "other" federal or state common law. It does not
contain language that on its face limits the section to intrastate activities.
The Act in its original form did not provide for citizen suits, though
it had been interpreted as providing for private rights of action for
recovery of response costs.' In 1986, however, a citizen suit provision
that included a saving clause was added."16 The saving clause succinctly
provides 'that the "Chapter does not affect or otherwise impair the rights
of any person under Federal, State or common law . .1.117 Unlike
all of the other citizen suit provisions examined (including those of the
Clean Water Act, which were interpreted in International Paper as limited
by the language "in this section"), this provision's saving clause is not
limited only to "this section." Instead it applies to the entirety of the
Act. Furthermore section 309 of the Act, which deals with the appli-
cability of state prescription rules, applies to any action "brought under
State law for personal injury, or property damages,""' 8 clearly contem-
plating the use of state tort law to remedy such injuries.
In enacting CERCLA, Congress rejected proposed preemption and
tort law provisions, and instead included section 301(e), which calls for
113. Id. at § 9614(a).
114. Id. at § 9652(d). The section goes on to specifically preserve strict liability doctrines
in such disputes.
115. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp.,. 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659 (Supp. 1988). Pub. L. 99-499, § 206, Oct. 17, 1986, 100
Stat. 1703.
117. Id. at § 9659(h).
118. Id. at § 9658(a)(1).
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a study of the adequacy of legal remedies and necessary reforms." 9 The
completed study rejected the desirability of a federal cause of action
for personal injury and property damages.120 The language in section
309 and the above saving clause support this conclusion. The question
is whether, in specifically preserving state law rights of action and
implicitly rejecting federal rights of action for personal injury or property
damages, the Act necessarily prefers one state's law over the other. The
language "[nlothing in this Act shall affect or modify in any way"
common law remedies indicates that it does not.' 2' Furthermore, the
policy choices present in RCRA, Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act
dealing with source state authority to prospectively regulate environ-
mental activity are not present in CERCLA, which is a remedial statute.
The courts that have faced the preemption issue under CERCLA
have generally concluded that common law actions are preserved. The
Allied Towing court refused to be influenced by the circuit court debate
over the Clean Water Act's preemption of state nuisance law and held
that the CERCLA did not preempt state causes of action for damages. 22
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently reached the same conclusion, 23
and a United States District Court in Louisiana held that an action filed
under nuisance law not specifically alleging CERCLA violations was not
brought under the Act and therefore could not constitute federal question
jurisdiction. 24
No cases have yet faced the issue of what state law would apply
in interstate hazardous waste suits. There does not seem to be any reason
why normal choice of law rules should not apply. The limited type of
saving provisions and the basic policy concerns present in prospective
environmental regulatory statutes are not present in a remedial statute
such as CERCLA. Therefore, the rationale of International Paper should
not apply.
C. Relationship of RCRA to CERCLA
The conclusion, therefore, is that the affected state's law should be
preempted under RCRA, but not under CERCLA. The relationship
between these two statutes, then, will control the preemption question.
119. -1d. at § 9651(e). See Light, Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the
New Superfund Act, 38 Mercer L. Rev. 643, 655 (1987); Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Waste:
Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies (Comm. Print. 1982).
120. Id. Light, supra note 119, at 656-57, Report, supra note 119, at 255-71.
121. 42 U.S.C. 9652(d).
122. Allied Towing, 642 F. Supp. at 1352.
123. Attorney General v. Thomas Solvent Co., 146 Mich. App. 55, 380 N.W.2d 53
(1985).
124. McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services, 514 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. La. 1981).
[Vol. 49
COMMENTS
CERCLA is extremely broad and could conceivably be extended to
virtually all hazardous waste disputes. In relation to RCRA, its scope
is limited by section 1070). This section provides that "recovery by any
person for response costs or damages resulting from a federally permitted
release shall be pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section. '"' 5
"Federally permitted release" is defined in section 101(10)(E) as "releases
in compliance with a legally enforceable final permit issued pursuant to
section 3005(a) through (d) of [RCRA] from a hazardous waste treat-
ment, storage or disposal facility ....
A number of problems arise under this exclusion. One problem is
that very few hazardous waste facilities have received final permits. Most
of the facilities in operation today are under "interim status" under
section 3005(e) of RCRA. 27 This status is conferred on those facilities
in operation that have applied for a final permit. During this interim
period, the operation of the facility is regulated by RCRA and regulations
promulgated thereunder in a similar, although less extensive, manner as
those facilities under a final permit. The section further provides that
any person owning or operating a facility under interim status "shall
be treated as having been issued a final permit.' ' 28
The question to be answered is whether a release from a facility
under interim status is included in CERCLA's section 1070) exclusion.
The argument for the exclusion is that RCRA requires those under
interim status to be treated as having been issued a final permit, and
those with a final permit are not liable under CERCLA. In effect, this
would mean that CERCLA should apply only to inactive or abandoned
waste sites.
The counterargument is that the Act specifically provides that only
those facilities with a final permit get the benefit of the exclusion. This
argument is more persuasive. First of all, CERCLA was enacted after
RCRA. The drafters were aware of the interim status facilities, yet still
specified only those in compliance with final permits. The legislative
history of this section clearly indicates that the scope of the exclusion
is to be limited only to those with final permits: "sites or facilities
which have interim status under RCRA do not adequately utilize ac-
ceptable levels of technology, and do not qualify for the exclusion.' ' 29
125. 42 U.S.C. § 96070).
126. Id. at § 9601(10)(E). The section also includes releases under the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act.
127. Id. at § 6925(e).
128. Id.
129. S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980). See also Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984) (CERCLA independent of and
in addition to RCRA, and applies to active and inactive sites).
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One case applying this rationale was Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.30 Chemical Waste was an
owner-operator of an interim status facility that was required to take
corrective action under RCRA. Chemical Waste sued a hazardous waste
generator for response costs contribution under CERCLA. RCRA does
not allow an owner-operator to recover such costs from a generator.
The generator argued that CERCLA could not be applied to a release
from such a facility. The court held that CERCLA was not intended
to be so limited, but was intended to broaden the liability of responsible
parties. Allowing the contribution claim was consistent with this policy.
Another problem with the exclusion is that it applies only to those
releases that comply with the final permit. Since the legislative history
and the policy cited in Armstrong indicate that the exclusion should be
interpreted strictly, releases in violation of such a permit would not get
the exclusion. Therefore, CERCLA may be applied to any hazardous
waste release except in the narrow instance where the release is from a
facility in compliance with a final RCRA permit.'
As far as preemption of the affected state's law is concerned, the
context in which RCRA applies becomes important. When RCRA applies
130. 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
131. There may be a further question about the scope of the exemption. Section 107(j)
provides that recovery of damages and response costs shall be pursuant to "existing law
in lieu of this section." Applying the reasoning that the court applied in the citizen suit
saving clause in International Paper, one could limit the exclusion to response costs or
damages incurred under section 107. Under this rationale, the EPA could still issue an
administrative order under section 106(a), which allows the EPA to order a private party
to begin a response action when the release presents an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to the public health or welfare.
However, a private party seeking damages and response costs could not recover from
other private parties under section 106. Only the EPA has such authority. Thus, this
interpretation of section 1070) does not affect the rationale of this paper, which is
concerned with the law applicable to a suit brought by private individuals.
Furthermore, this interpretation is arguably incorrect. In United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103, 1113 (D. N.J. 1983), the court held that § 106 is dependent upon the
substantive provisions, which explain liability in § 107. And in United States v. Bliss,
667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987), the court held that the only classes of persons
liable under § 106 are the classes of persons identified in § 107. Moreover, the legislative
history of this section provides that "the reported bill authorizes response to federally
permitted releases, but requires costs to be assessed against the permit holder under the
liability provisions of other laws, not [CERCLA]"; and "the determination of exactly
what liability standards, defenses, or other rules apply will be made on a case-by-case
basis pursuant to regimes other than that of [CERCLA]." S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 46 (1980). It could be argued from this that Congress intended to create an
exemption applying to the Act as a whole. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp.
665 (D. Idaho 1986) (CERCLA could only be applied when releases were not made under
a permit, or in violation of a permit limitation). For an excellent discussion taking the
position that the exclusion is limited to section 107, see Brennan and Hart, Federally
Permitted Releases and Liability Under CERCLA, 16 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 172 (1988).
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to a release from an interim status facility, or a release in violation of
a final permit, CERCLA should also apply. The question should be
whether the imposition of liability under the affected state's law would
interfere with the purposes and methods of RCRA when there has not
been compliance with a final permit. In other words, should RCRA
preempt the affected state's law when CERCLA is also available and
does not preempt that law?
RCRA should control. The imposition of liability under the affected
state's law due to a release from an interim status facility sufficiently
interferes with the regulatory scheme to infer preemption. The same is
true for violations of a final permit. To hold otherwise would effectively
nullify all but those portions of RCRA regulating releases in compliance
with a final permit.
Logically, the focus should be on whether RCRA applies to the
dispute, not whether CERCLA does. If RCRA applies, the affected
state's law is preempted notwithstanding CERCLA. If RCRA does not
apply, such as with an inactive or abandoned site, or illegal releases,
only CERCLA applies. In these situations, nothing in CERCLA preempts
the affected state's law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding in International Paper should be extended to both the
Clean Air Act and RCRA. Like the Clean Water Act, both regulate
prospectively. They both allow the states to play a supplementary role
in regulating and imposing liability for personal injury or property
damage. Also, they both contain language limiting the citizen suit saving
clause to the citizen suit section alone. While the state law retention
provisions are not limited by their language to intrastate activity, the
Acts could supply such a limitation given the narrow effect of the citizen
suit saving clauses. Finally, both Acts rely on prospective policy choices
made in the source states to implement the regulatory scheme.
There may be exceptions to preemption under the Clean Air Act.
Certain pollutants, such as acid rain, are not regulated by the Act. Suits
relating to these unregulated pollutants could involve the law of the
affected state without interfering with any policy choices made by the
permit authority. In these situations, the affected state's law should not
be preempted.
CERCLA, however, is a remedial statute. Its very purpose is to
allocate liability for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites. Its numerous
saving provisions specifically prevent the entirety of the Act from pre-
empting common law remedies, and there are no significant policy choices
made in the source state that would be interfered with by the imposition
of liability under the affected state's law. Therefore, if ordinary choice
of law rules require the application of the affected state's law, nothing
in CERCLA prevents the courts from applying that law.
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In situations where both RCRA and CERCLA apply, the question
becomes more complicated. RCRA should control the preemption issue.
If it applies, the affected state's law is preempted, notwithstanding the
dual application of CERCLA. However, if only CERCLA applies, li-
ability may be imposed under the affected state's law.
Scott C. Seiler
